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UNCONSCIOUS CONTENT: WHAT IS IT 
LIKE TO THINK THAT P WHEN THERE 
IS NOTHING IT IS LIKE?1
abstract
Many have come to argue recently for the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT). PIT can be best 
defined as a reduction of intentional properties to phenomenal properties. One of the challenges in 
construing intentionality in PIT terms is explaining unconscious thoughts. The issue comes down to the 
incompatibility of PIT with the claim of Unconscious Intentionality (UI), or more precisely, the claim that 
there are genuinely intentional unconscious states. There are two ways in which the proponents of PIT 
proceed. Most philosophers argue for some relation of derivation of unconscious intentional states from 
conscious phenomenally intentional states. Firstly, I argue that this option is abandoning the program. 
Thus, the only way one can proceed, if one wishes to remain within the PIT framework, is to argue for 
genuine unconscious phenomenal intentionality. Secondly, I consider Pitt’s proposal for unconscious 
phenomenal intentionality. I argue that, while Pitt stays within the PIT framework, his model does 
not take into account the necessity of the self for phenomenal (un)consciousness. Lastly, I suggest an 
outline of a third approach, based on Pitt’s proposal, that takes into account the necessity of subject for 
intentionality or what-is-it-like-for-me-ness.
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Many  have come to argue recently for the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT)2. PIT can be 
best defined as the thesis according to which intentionality is constituted by phenomenal 
character, or more precisely, a reduction of intentional properties to phenomenal properties. 
Different proponents argue differently for the nature of this reduction. Some (Pitt 2004; 
Strawson 2008) argue for an identity relation; phenomenal and intentional properties are just 
the same kind of properties. Others maintain that the connection is of asymmetric metaphysical 
dependence. Namely, intentional properties at the very least supervene on phenomenal 
properties – but not vice versa3 (Horgan & Tienson 2002; Horgan & Graham 2012). The third 
option is a sort of stronger anti-symmetric relation, in which the phenomenal properties ground 
the intentional, or the latter obtain in virtue of the former (Kriegel 2011; 2013)4.
One of the main intuitions for PIT is content determinacy that phenomenal properties secure; 
“…there is a determinate fact of the matter about what you are thinking and what you mean by 
your utterance, because there is something it is like to think a determinate thought and to make an 
utterance that expresses that thought” (Horgan & Graham 2012, p. 339)5. If PIT is true, then the 
phenomenal properties guarantee content determination. On the other hand, externalist theories 
are understood in terms of tracking intentionality to the features of the subject’s environment 
(Mendelovici & Bourget, 2014). There is a mapping relation between the subject’s mental state S 
and an object in the environment O, which serves as a stimulus that reliably causes S. However, 
there may be numerous stimuli that can cause S, beside O. For example, my representation 
of a lime can be caused by a lime or by an immature lemon. This inability to distinguish 
representations from misrepresentations in the subject’s inner mental state is the disjunction 
problem. However, the challenge is not just to explain why the representation is the representation 
1 The title of this paper refers to David Pitt’s (2004) most significant article, “The Phenomenology of Cognition: What 
Is It Like to Think That P”.
2  Among others: Horgan & Tienson (2002); Horgan, Tienson & Graham (2004); Horgan & Graham (2012); Kriegel (2007, 
2011a, 2011b, 2013); Loar (1987, 2003) ; Siewert (2011); Strawson (1994, 2008, 2011); Pitt (2004, 2011).
3  The same holds for the opposite claim, i.e. it is the phenomenal properties that are dependent on the intentional. Indeed, 
representationalists, for the most part, defend such a position (Dretske (1995); Fodor (1990); Lycan (1996); Tye (1995)).
4  Explanatory relations are generally considered to be anti-symmetrical, and I abide with this in what follows. 
Thanks to Giuliano Torrengo for pointing this out. 
5  This presupposes that the phenomenal properties in question are distinctive, that is, it is different to have a 
conscious occurent thought that P from conscious occurent thought that Q. While I am aware that this presupposition 




of a lime, as opposed to immature lemon, but also why that particular representation has any 
determinate content. Thereby, if one accepts PIT, one avoids these externalist worries of tracking 
intentionality to something external to the mental state. Phenomenal properties are the decisive 
set of properties for content determination; what representations represent is determined by the 
what-it-is-like character when we experience them.
Regardless of the different stances on the specific nature of PIT, its proponents agree that 
phenomenal intentionality is the fundamental kind of intentionality in a twofold sense. 
First, it is fundamental because it is the intrinsic intentionality as opposed to the extrinsic, 
non-phenomenal construal of intentionality. Second, it is fundamental because it is the only 
genuine form of intentionality and other non-phenomenal kinds of intentionality derive their 
content from it.
Some terminological remarks are due. By “intrinsic” I simply mean non-relational. On the 
same note, being extrinsic implies relational properties. That does not imply that all mental 
states that are relational are fully and only extrinsic. For example, thinking that the Eiffel 
tower is in Paris is a relational property since it entails a relation to the Eiffel tower which is 
itself an external entity. However, the content of the thought itself is an intrinsic property 
as it never extends beyond your mind6. Similarly, a state has derivative intentionality if its 
intentionality depends on the intentionality of some other state; otherwise it has original 
intentionality. Thus, a genuinely intentional state, as I define it, is the one that has original 
and intrinsic intentionality, or, a genuinely intentional state has intentionality that does not 
depend on something external to the state and its intentionality is not a result of a relation to 
some other state, e.g. second-order thought, ascription of content, and similar.
One of the challenges in construing intentionality in PIT terms is explaining the content 
determination of unconscious thoughts. If intentional mental states are constituted by their 
phenomenal character, then explaining unconscious mental states is prima facie a serious issue 
for the view. The issue comes down to the incompatibility of PIT with the claim of Unconscious 
Intentionality (UI):
(PIT) – Intentional contents are reducible to phenomenal character.
(UI) - There are genuinely intentional unconscious states.
Thus, if one wants to preserve PIT, there are two ways, in which she can proceed when 
considering UI: (1) deny genuine intentionality to unconscious states, or (2) argue that PIT and 
UI are compatible.
(1) seems plausible. One can argue that unconscious states do not exhibit genuinely intentional 
content since they suffer from content indeterminacy which is fixed by phenomenal 
properties7. By accepting this view, one also accepts that: 
(i) Phenomenology is necessarily conscious; hence 
(ii) Intentionality is necessarily conscious.
While (1) is a tenable view, my primary goal in this paper is to bite the bullet and argue for (2), 
i.e. the compatibility of PIT and UI. Again, there are two ways one can proceed. Most biters 
6  In that sense my phenomenal duplicate and me, when we think that the Eiffel tower is in Paris, are thinking the 
same thought. This corresponds to the distinction between broad and narrow content (see Horgan & Tienson, 2002). 
However, I will not go further in this matter.
7  Strawson (2011) holds this view for all mental states.
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agree on (i), though they do not agree on (ii). More precisely, they argue for some relation 
of derivation of the intentionality of unconscious intentional states from that of conscious 
phenomenally intentional states. This is the claim of derivative unconscious intentionality 
(DUI) – unconscious states do not exhibit original phenomenally intentional content, but 
get their content determinacy from other phenomenally intentional states, hence they are 
intentional in the derived manner. Since phenomenal intentionality is the fundamental kind 
of intentionality and every other kind derives from it, they argue that this is sufficient for a 
state to be regarded as genuinely intentional within the PIT framework.
The other option is to deny both (i) and (ii). Phenomenology is not necessarily conscious; 
hence unconscious states are genuinely phenomenally intentional. The concept of 
unconscious phenomenology is not a contradiction. Denying (i) and (ii), on the other hand, 
would be the claim of un-derivative unconscious intentionality (Un-DUI) – unconscious states 
exhibit genuine phenomenal intentionality; hence they get their content determinacy directly 
from phenomenally intentional character un-derivatively.
I argue (§2.) that denying the Un-DUI, as the first option does, would amount to abandoning 
the phenomenal intentionality program; hence, I argue that the only way one can proceed, 
if one wishes to remain within the PIT framework, is to argue for unconscious phenomenal 
intentionality. In §3 I consider Pitt’s proposal for Un-DUI; I call it the awareness dualism 
model, which rests on Dretske’s distinction between object-awareness and fact-awareness. 
I argue that, though Pitt stays within the PIT framework, his model does not take into 
account the necessity of the self for phenomenal (un)consciousness. In section §4, I outline a 
third approach, based on Pitt’s proposal, that takes into account the necessity of subject for 
intentionality or what-is-it-like-for-me-ness.
If one believes in UI and wants to preserve PIT, then she has to explain the relation 
between phenomenology and intentionality of unconscious states. There are two courses 
of action she can take: either derive unconscious non-phenomenal intentionality from 
conscious phenomenal intentionality in some sense, or argue for unconscious phenomenal 
intentionality. I start with discussing Searle’s potentialism (§2.1.) and Kriegel’s interpretativism 
(§2.2.), two proposals for deriving unconscious non-phenomenal intentionality from conscious 
phenomenal intentionality8. In §2.3., I argue that any proposal of DUI is inconsistent with PIT.
Searle’s (1991) central phrase, in discussing intentional states, is aspectual shape. “The link, 
then, between intentionality and consciousness lies in the notion of aspectual shape” (p.51). 
While he does not provide a clear-cut definition of aspectual shape, I read it as equivalent to 
8  Pitt (forthcoming) clarifies the debate in more detail. He considers, in addition, Graham & Horgan and Smithies’ 
position. Smithies (2012) develops a variation of Searle’s proposal. However, Graham & Horgan (2012) offer three 
positions. Their first position is that the unconscious mental states do not have a determinate content since they 
lack PI (a position that they reject as incompatible with realism about the unconscious); the second one purports 
to potentially conscious states, which is essentially Searle’s suggestion; and the third one: unconscious states get 
their content determinacy by being integrated in the cognitive system and, since some states of the system are 
phenomenally conscious, they provide “anchor points” from which non-phenomenal states get their content 
determinacy such that the system exhibits “high degree of internal rational coherence” (p. 341). Although Graham 
& Horgan opt for the third position, they do not expand on it nor provide arguments for it. In addition, while 
this proposal is interesting in its own right, it purports to derived forms of intentionality once again, so it shares 
similarities with the proposals I consider. Strawson (1994, 2008), on the other hand, offers a fourth position which 
does not hinge on conscious states in themselves, but rather on creatures capable of consciousness. In that manner, 
he derives intentionality of unconscious states from capacity of consciousness. Strawson’s proposal is again a case of 
derived intentionality. It is also problematic, in my opinion, since it contends to dispositional properties, a point I will 
address later on. However, in the 2011 paper Strawson denies intentionality to non-experiential states altogether. 
2. Compatibility of 




the notion of mode of presentation9. “Thought and experience and hence intrinsic intentional 
states generally, have a certain sort of aspectual shape. They represent their conditions of 
satisfaction under aspects” (p. 53). Different modes of presentation constitute different ways 
an agent might think about an object or state of affairs. As such, their referent and thus, 
conditions of satisfaction, remain the same. For example, it is not the same for me to think 
that the morning star is Venus and that the evening star is Venus, though the conditions of 
satisfaction are the same.
The aspectual shape makes a difference in my representations in terms of the subjective 
character regularly associated with it, i.e. “...the way that the aspectual shape matters is that 
it is constitutive of the way the agent thinks about the subject matter…” (ibidem). For Searle 
an aspectual shape is necessarily subjective, e.g. I love the taste water, but I do not have any 
feelings associated with the taste of H2O. Thus, in Searle’s terms, the subjective nature of 
intentional states is crucial, since no third personal perspective can convene the aspectual 
shape. For Searle, content determinacy stems from first person perspective (Searle 1987).
While I agree with Searle on the crucial relevance of subjective consciousness, the problem 
arises when one tries to ascribe aspectual shape to unconscious states. Since intentionality 
necessarily involves an aspectual shape, and aspectual shape necessarily involves the first 
person perspective, it is not clear how to account for the intentionality of unconscious 
states on Searle’s account, since it is evident that unconscious states have no subjective, 
first personal perspective to them. Searle seems to ends up in contradiction, for he states 
that the ontology of unconscious states, while unconscious, is a “purely neurophysiological 
phenomena” (p. 57). And, since neurophysiological phenomena can be described just from the 
third person perspective, as one does not undergo first person experience of them, one cannot 
ascribe aspectual shapes to them which are central in regarding a state as intentional (and 
thus mental).
Searle’s solution to the contradiction is positing potentially conscious contents as the basis 
for genuinely intentional unconscious contents. “…any intentional state is either actually or 
potentially a conscious intentional state…” (p. 47). If unconscious states are to be regarded as 
“genuinely mental they must in some sense preserve their aspectual shape…but the only sense 
that we can give to the notion that they preserve their aspectual shape when unconscious is 
that they are possible contents of consciousness” (p. 57). The potentiality Searle has in mind 
is cashed out in terms of causal capacity of the unconscious intentional state to produce a 
subjectively intentional conscious state. The underlying brain state preserves its aspectual 
shape by having a causal capacity to produce a conscious state10. In effect, unconscious mental 
states derive their intentional content from conscious states, since, in principle, they are 
potentially conscious in virtue of their causal capacity to produce consciousness.
However, positing potentially conscious states as ground for intentionality does not solve the 
contradiction11. The relation between potentially conscious states and actually conscious states 
rests on two conditions: (i) the underlying neurophysiological processes must have a capacity 
9  In this I agree with Coleman (manuscript, p. 5). Pitt, while puzzled as well on the notion of aspectual shape suggests 
that cognitive phenomenology “plays the role Searle assigns to aspectual shape” (forthcoming p. 3).
10  Note that Searle holds that, while unconscious, there is no difference between my unconscious belief that e.g. 
water is H2O and my underlying neuronal activity of that belief. He makes no difference between purely informational 
states and simply subconscious states, which seems inconsistent with empirical findings (Kihlstom 1987). The question 
how strictly unconscious states, e.g. dorsal processes, can be potentially conscious remains unclear in Searle’s writing.
11  See Pitt (forthcoming) who acknowledges same problems in Searle. Similar points were raised by Sam Coleman at 
“Yet Another Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality” in his talk at CEU, Budapest and in his paper “Unconscious 
Qualitative Character as the Basis for Content” (manuscript, p. 7).
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to produce the relevant conscious experience, and (ii) this relation is causal. Both of these 
conditions evoke talk of dispositions, and the problem with dispositions, as Coleman and Pitt 
point out, is that they are not identical to the properties they cause. If the neurophysiological 
state R has the causal capacity to produce a vivid experience of red and it is causally relevant 
for the conscious phenomenology of redness that is subsequently experienced, one would 
still not attribute the redness to the underlying disposition of the neurophysiological state 
(Coleman manuscript, p. 7; Pitt forthcoming, p. 5).
While Coleman and Pitt stress the fact that the properties and the dispositions causing them 
are not identical, which makes it either the case that the unconscious states lack intentionality 
altogether, or that there is no bridge between unconscious and conscious intentionality 
anymore, I would add that they are also not contentful in the appropriate manner. Certainly, 
the unconscious state can cause the conscious one, however the former cannot, by doing 
so, derive its content from the latter. The gap still remains. For example, if I throw an ill-
proportioned stone in the pond and by doing so cause the waves to spread in even circles, 
that does not make the stone itself circular12. In that sense, unconscious states do not have 
aspectual shapes that are in any way relevant to the aspectual shapes of the conscious states. 
At best, they have a different aspectual shape, which constitutes them as two distinct states 
with two distinct contents; one unconscious, the other conscious.
If these two aspectual shapes are different, then there is no bridge between them and, thus, 
no manner in which Searle can derive any content determinacy of unconscious states. In 
addition, it is not sufficient simply to have a theoretical notion of an aspectual shape without 
subjectively determined intentional content. And if qualitative character is to fix the content 
of a state, and by doing so, it fixes the intentionality as well, then the aspectual shape of 
the unconscious state that Searle has in mind, does no actual work. Either it is a different 
aspectual shape, in which case a bridge that narrows the gap between the two contents is 
missing, or unconscious states lack aspectual shape altogether since they do not have an 
inherently experiential, first personal mode of presentation that fixes the content directly. If it 
is a different aspectual shape that constitutes contents of unconscious states, then those states 
are fully intentional on their own and there is no need to derive contents anymore. On the 
second option, Searle ends up denying intentionality altogether13. The unconscious states are 
no longer genuinely intentional.
Phenomenal intentionality is intrinsic and narrow, meaning it does not depend on some 
other properties or states of the subject, and simply suggesting a systemic causal correlation 
between a neural state and a mental state does not give the former the inherently mental 
character of the latter, even if the neural state could possibly be a mental state with similar 
content14.
Kriegel (2011a) adopts a proposal somewhat similar to Dennett’s. Dennett’s Intentional 
Systems Theory (IST) (Dennett 1971) states that everything is intentional in virtue of a 
subject taking an intentional stance towards it. An intuitive objection to Dennett, which, in 
addition, holds for all cases of dualism of original/derivative intentionality, is that deriving 
intentionality necessarily ends up in infinite regress (Dennett 1987). Hence, one needs to 
postulate some privileged entities or processes that stop the regress. Dennett’s solution is 
that, since regress cannot be negated, it should simply be stopped by dividing the “intentional 
12  Coleman (manuscript, p. 7) makes a similar point. 
13  See Pitt (forthcoming) and Coleman (manuscript) who acknowledge the same problem. 





system” into its constitutive subsystems that are slightly less intelligent, thus less intentional, 
and continuously repeat the process until we reach the level of individual neurons. The end 
result is a “finite regress” that denies that a property such as intrinsic intentionality exists, 
since one cannot account for it at the level of individual neurons. All intentionality is ascribed; 
thus, there is no mystery involved in giving a naturalistic definition of it, as well as no 
controversy in regarding intentionality as an extrinsic, relational property. Every intentional 
state gets its intentional character by ascription; the way the system has intentional states is 
grounded in the way the observer interprets it as being such-and-such.
Kriegel (2011a) adopts Dennett’s interpretivism, although with a substantial difference. He 
maintains, following Loar (2003), the actuality of original, un-derived intentionality; however 
it is reserved for conscious phenomenal states from which phenomenally unconscious states 
derive their intentional character. That is, “unconscious intentionality is grounded ultimately 
in a certain type of cognitive phenomenology, namely, the cognitive phenomenology of 
conscious interpretation” (Kriegel 2011a, p. 94). 
“Interpretivism” appeals to the so called “web of intentional concepts” which we employ in 
order to produce the best possible explanations of behaviors of “intentional systems”. The idea 
is, the “intentional stance” of the interpreter, composed of his “web of intentional concepts”, 
ascribes a content based on the inference to the best possible explanation. This suggests that 
every intentional state derives its content from some other intentional state; hence infinite 
regress, an already familiar outcome.
Kriegel, to avoid this outcome, posits a class of “privileged intentional states”, in order to 
preserve original intentionality. These “privileged intentional states”, correspondingly, are 
conscious intentional states that are phenomenally constituted. What gives an unconscious 
intentional state the content it has is conscious intentionality, that is, the unconscious state is 
consciously cognitively interpreted in some manner. In other words, infinite regress ends in 
conscious cognitive intentional acts of interpretation which have their content underivatively 
or “for any unconscious intentional state, there is some possible ideal interpreter who, under 
some conditions, produces an intentional interpretation of that state, and moreover does so 
consciously” (Kriegel 2011a, p. 84).
However, as Pitt (forthcoming) points out, the problem is that a state can have many, if not an 
infinite number of interpretations, meaning just “as many intentional contents”. Similarly 
and somewhat interconnected, this proposal, in my opinion, invokes the notions of an 
ideal interpreter and of indeterminacy. Since we are dealing with the ideal interpreters 
or “‘subjects who exercise the intentional stance perfectly under all conditions” (Kriegel 
2011a, p. 84), he will not assign the interpretation if there are two equally applicable stances. 
Kriegel addresses this point, though he states that “this kind of content indeterminacy 
should be extremely infrequent, and to that extent harmless” (Kriegel 2011a, p. 88). Kriegel 
expects that in “standard cases” the best interpretation is always available, and the ideal 
interpreter should recognize it. However, I want to emphasize that there still is some room 
for indeterminacy, while in the case of original intentionality, if phenomenally constituted, 
one cannot be erroneous, since how something appears is how something is15. There is no 
stable interpretation and no limit to the variety of contents that the interpreter can yield, 
making those unconscious states, by definition, states with undetermined content, which, in 
return, makes them not genuinely intentional states. And if phenomenal intentionality is the 
15  However, note that this does not imply that one possesses “infallible knowledge about what one’s first-order 
intentional states are” (Horgan & Tienson 2002, p. 528). As Horgan & Tienson point out further “Beliefs about one’s own 
intentional states are second-order intentional states...” and “...such beliefs are sometimes mistaken”’ (2002, p. 528).
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sort of intentionality that is fundamental and grounds content on the basis of its determinacy 
through phenomenology, then one cannot accommodate semi determinate content.
Pitt (forthcoming) points out, in addition, the fact that the interpretation does not, in any manner 
whatsoever, change “the intrinsic nature of the interpreted state”. Kriegel does not, by any 
means, disguise this fact as he states that, when examining unconscious states, a state x has 
content C because the interpreter assigns to the state x the content C (Kriegel 2011a). However, the 
third person, extrinsic perspective on an intentional state does not reveal anything of its nature.
On this picture, unconscious intentionality is, as Kriegel names it, a kind of “response-
dependent property”, which is characterized in terms of dispositions (Kriegel 2011a, p. 84). 
“…the unconscious item must have the disposition to elicit the right interpretation in the 
right interpreter, but not that the disposition must be manifested” (Kriegel 2011a, p. 88). The 
content-free unconscious states have a disposition to cause, under the right conditions for 
the ideal interpreter, determinate content by eliciting the best explanation in the interpreter. 
Strawson notes “…a disposition…is just not the kind of thing that can possibly be contentful in 
the way that it needs to be if it is to be an intentional thing – even if it can be identified as the 
particular disposition it is only by reference to the proposition (the content)…, which is itself 
an (abstract) intentional entity” (Strawson 2008, p. 303). The unconscious states themselves 
do not constitutively determine content, since they are content free. It is the interpreter’s 
conscious tracking of intentionality and ascription of content that gives these states the 
determinate content they have. This tracking is external to the state in question, however, and 
in that sense analogue to the naturalized, externalist intentionality theories.
By defending such a view, Kriegel truly does accommodate unconscious content, however not 
fully within the PIT framework. And if one is in the business of deriving intentionality, why 
stop there? Perhaps there are more kinds of intentionality. Perhaps there are even numerous 
kinds, hundreds or thousands. The fact remains, only the intrinsic, narrow kind is the genuine 
kind of intentionality, and other kinds are simply not intentionality.
Any framework of ascription of content to intentional states, whether it is in Searle’s or 
Kriegel’s terms, is equally extrinsic as Dennett’s proposal; it presupposes that the derived 
intentional state gets its intentionality externally from the intrinsically intentional state of a 
genuinely intentional agent. The only genuine intentionality is that of the intrinsic kind and 
any form of derivation is simply not adequate to capture the intentional content of the state in 
the PIT sense.
One might argue that, since I am interested in the intentionality of our mental states, 
deriving unconscious from conscious is really a trivial issue. Phenomenal intentionality is 
the fundamental kind of intentionality and every other kind is reducible to it, including 
unconscious one. Granted, one could not leave any room for indeterminacy in the fundamental 
kind of intentionality. However, states that are derivatively intentional do not have 
intentionality as their intrinsic property: they receive it from somewhere else – i.e., genuinely 
intentional (phenomenal) states16.
On this reading, Kriegel accepts that the intentionality of unconscious states is quite different 
from the intentionality of conscious ones. His claim is precisely that derived intentionality 
is not genuine intentionality. He assumes that there is a difference between conscious and 
unconscious states, and hence between conscious and unconscious intentionality, and 
accounts for this difference in terms of phenomenal intentionality. Yet, he does not attribute 
phenomenal intentionality to unconscious states.
16  Thanks to Davide Bordini for pointing this out.




However, if we invoke such dualist notions, we are simply not talking about intentionality 
anymore. Why should we accept two kinds of intentionality in the PIT framework considering 
the emphasis on the importance of the phenomenally constituted kind? Especially, why should 
we accept a derived kind of intentionality that rests on third personal, external ascriptions of 
content? This solution seems inconsistent with the program. The state has the content that 
it has precisely because of the what-it-is-like character to have that particular content. An 
extrinsic ascription of any kind does not make the state causally or informationally different 
in any relevant sense. And by relevant sense, I simply mean the intrinsic nature of the state. If 
one derives intentional content from other phenomenally constituted contents, there is a gap 
in individuating the former in terms of the latter, since the latter is inefficacious in the two 
aforementioned senses. It is inefficacious causally since the interpretation is extrinsic to the 
relevant state17; it is inefficacious informationally because what is represented on a conscious 
level and ascribed as content to the unconscious state need not be consistent with the intrinsic 
nature of the state18.
This issue is especially intuitive when we consider that most would agree that there is no 
such thing as derivative phenomenology. Simply, how something is like is how something 
is experienced. If phenomenology constitutes intentionality, then accepting two kinds of 
intentionality seems inconsistent. One kind, on this view, is the phenomenal one grounded 
in the what-is-it-like character, while the other is grounded in the conscious interpretations 
of what-is-it-like character. This does not amount to genuine intentionality but is simply 
treated as-if it is genuine intentionality. We would not allow as-if phenomenally conscious 
character of a mental state; either I experience the bitterness of my coffee or I do not. There 
is no experience as-if of bitterness. By accepting as-if intentionality, we are accepting as-if 
intentional contents; which are again indeterminate under the PIT framework19.
In other words, on this reading of Kriegel, one can accommodate unconscious intentional 
contents by deriving them from conscious phenomenally intentional contents, but one does 
not intuitively call such derived contents intentionality. Certainly, one can always define 
intentionality* or intentionality1 that pick up the relevant properties of unconscious states, 
however these do not amount to intentionality and there is a tension in such dualist approach 
that seems counterintuitive to the PIT framework. 
There is another possible course of action left for a proponent of PIT: to argue, in some 
manner, for Un-DUI, or, genuine unconscious intentionality. One possible path is to argue 
for intrinsic phenomenal properties of unconscious states; argue that the concept of 
unconscious phenomenology is not a contradiction. Cases of e.g. blindsight, dorsal visual 
stream, achromatopsia, and priming, can be regarded as such cases. If there is such a thing as 
unconscious perceptual phenomenology, then there is no prima facie problem for unconscious 
phenomenal thought as well. While there is no apparent contradiction in regarding them as 
genuinely phenomenally intentional unconscious states, these cases are highly debatable and 
most cognitive scientists would not interpret them as cases of unconscious phenomenology in 
the manner that proponents of PIT have in mind.
A second option is to explore the notion of un/consciousness being an intrinsic property of 
mental states. On this view, a state can be conscious in itself but not for the cognizer20. Thus, a 
17  Coleman (manuscript, pp. 9-10) also recognizes this problem.
18  Pitt (forthcoming, pp. 11-12) presents an argument of this sort.
19  Although Kriegel does not use this term, I am not alone in thinking that unconscious states end up having as-if 
intentional contents under his view. Pitt and Coleman come to the same conclusion.  
20  Whether the opposite holds - a state unconscious in itself but conscious for the cognizer - is a more complicated 
issue. One cannot ever be conscious of some mental states, e.g. the processes of the dorsal stream, no matter how 
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state has an intrinsic property of being conscious; however it is unconscious for the cognizer21. 
This is the course of action that Pitt takes, hence I will consider his view next.
Pitt (forthcoming), defends Un-DUI. His proposal rests on Dretske’s model of awareness 
of things and awareness of facts (1993). Roughly, the idea is that a mental state M can be 
conscious in itself, without being conscious for the cognizer, where this means that M is 
conscious but below the cognizer’s awareness threshold. The intuition can be best illustrated 
by using Armstrong’s famous driver example (Dretske 1993). The driver, after a long and 
tiresome drive realizes, at some point, that he has been driving for quite some time without 
being aware of the actions he was performing. It is safe to say that the driver did indeed 
perceive the road and was, in some sense, conscious of his actions as he would have otherwise 
crashed. However, he has no recollection of the actions performed or the perceptual stimuli 
from the road22.
Dretske (1993) distinguishes between “consciousness of things” and “consciousness of facts”, 
and since he takes consciousness and awareness as synonyms, the same distinction can be 
made between awareness of things and awareness of facts. By this he aims to distinguish 
“particular (spatial) objects and temporal (events) on the one hand from facts involving 
these things on the other” (Dretske 1993, p. 264). In that sense Dretske talks about “creature 
consciousness” which can be both “intrasensitive (of me)” and “transitive (of you)”. Secondly, 
a creature has “state consciousness” if it is conscious of other things. “State consciousness” is 
relation of subject S towards some x. Although about external things, “state consciousness” is 
always intrasensitive as that is the sense in which “internal states… are said to be conscious”, 
since it always involves some ground for consciousness (Dretske 1993, pp. 269-270). To be 
conscious intransitively is to simply be capable of conscious experience (as opposed to being 
in a state of coma, for example). But to be conscious transitively is to be aware of something 
in some way. Although one can be conscious of M transitively, e.g. one is aware of the stop 
sign in front of him , the mental state in virtue of which it is so conscious is not itself a kind 
of representation that suffices for it to be a conscious state. According to Dretske, being 
conscious of X is representing X, which makes being conscious a relational, non-intrinsic 
property of a subject.
Recall Armstrong’s driver. Dretske’s proposal is that the driver has “transitive creature 
consciousness of both things (the roads, the stop signs) and facts (that the road curves left, 
that the stop sign is red, etc.)” (Dretske 1993, p. 271). However the driver is not aware that he is 
aware of them. The driver lacks both thing-awareness and fact-awareness; or, more precisely, 
he lacks awareness of his occurring mental states, he is not aware that he is having the 
experience. For Dretske, that does not imply that the state itself is not conscious, it can be, but 
just not for the driver as it occurs. Dretske denies that consciousness is an intrinsic property 
of states. Conscious states are states that make us conscious (aware) of things (or states). But 
such states need not be themselves objects of consciousness. For Dretske, to be conscious 
much one is attentive to them. Perhaps only some mental states and not others can have such detachable un/
conscious properties.
21  Note that this is different from aforementioned states that have intrinsic phenomenal properties. In that sense we 
are talking about intrinsic unconscious phenomenology; a qualitative state that also has an intrinsic property of being 
unconscious (see Pitt (forthcoming) for some deliberations on this). While I regard the idea of this kind of unconscious 
phenomenology a coherent idea, I will not argue for it further in this paper.
22  An alternative way to explain this is by appealing to Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access 
consciousness (Block 1995). While I acknowledge that this explanation is an option to be considered, Pitt rejects that 
distinction. Since I am considering Pitt’s theory here, I will not address this point further. Moreover, my criticism to 
Pitt focuses on different problems of his account.
3. Compatibility 
of PIT and UI: Un-




of something is to represent it in a particular sort of way. This does not imply that one is 
conscious of the representation, however. In order to be conscious of the representation, 
one must form a representation of it. It is not the awareness of the mental state that makes it 
conscious, but rather “what makes an internal state or process conscious is the role it plays in 
making one (intransitively) conscious – normally, the role it plays in making one (transitively) 
conscious of some thing or a fact” (Dretske 1993, p. 280).
Pitt (forthcoming), relies on Dretske’s model, yet unlike Dretske, he takes consciousness to be 
an intrinsic property of mental states. He construes his proposal as a thought experiment. 
The aim of the thought experiment is to consider whether a state that is conscious in itself, 
without me being aware of it, can be considered mine. Thus, he proceeds along these lines. 
Penelope is a distinct individual whose thoughts originate in her brain. However, future 
advancements in technology allow us to somehow interconnect our nervous and cognitive 
systems. Penelope and I are not consciously aware of each other’s occurring thoughts nor 
does the connection affect the point of origin of the thoughts. They remain divided as our 
bodies and brains remain divided; her thoughts originate in her brain, my thoughts in mine. 
However, we are interconnected in such a way that I am “directly aware” of Penelope’s 
conscious thoughts as they occur. In other words, I am aware of someone else’s internal 
mental states. And in that sense Pitt asks: Can Penelope’s thoughts be mine? In addition, let us 
assume that from time to time those thoughts affect my behavior. Thus, the best explanation 
of my subsequent behavior is by reference to Penelope’s thoughts and not mine.
It is easy to translate this case to unconscious states: imagine I am no longer aware of 
Penelope’s occurring thoughts; still they continue to affect my behavior. One can even, as Pitt 
notes, connect our brains in a fusionlike manner , so one can even more easily attribute the 
behavior to the same individual. So, Pitt argues, it is not conceptually incoherent that there 
can be similar cases in my mind as well, that is, thoughts that are “…simultaneously conscious 
and unconscious. They are conscious in the sense that they have phenomenal character 
(where this is thought of as entailing consciousness); but they are unconscious in the sense 
that I am not directly aware of them” (Pitt forthcoming, p. 38).
Pitt’s main question is whether these thoughts can be considered to be mine, or, more 
precisely, ‘Is a state of mine conscious if and only if it is conscious for me?’ (Pitt forthcoming, p. 
34). Firstly, his proposal is problematic, because it does not involve any notion of the self as a 
ground for the thoughts in question. His proposal detaches the subject from the experience, 
making experiences linger in my mental life. Pitt acknowledges this, as he notes that perhaps 
the self and consciousness “are not intrinsically connected” (Pitt forthcoming, p. 39). The 
same holds for unconscious thoughts. I do not necessarily have to be aware of the occurring 
unconscious thought; however that thought must have some subjective relation to me in my 
overall cognitive life. Its affecting my behavior in the aforementioned detached sense does not 
make it causally or informationally connected to myself in any relevant way; it is inefficacious. 
Penelope’s thoughts have no narrow subjective relation to my overall cognitive life, narrow 
meaning here intrinsic. Moreover, it is not causally or informationally even relevant for my 
mental life since these thoughts are neither integrated in my neurophysiology nor my mental, 
conscious processing. For example, imagine that future advancements in science make it 
possible that my friend’s well-intended, however not taken, advice can be surgically implanted 
in my brain without me being aware of it. Is that thought mine? It is not, regardless of the 
origin of the thought23.




As a result, I do not have any immediate involvement in the mental state. Naturally, those 
thoughts can affect my behavior, but not my further conscious processing, as they remain 
detached. One can argue that they do affect my cognitive life in an indirect way: what I do, 
my behavior, based on Penelope’s thoughts, has further consequences on my mental life. 
However, these consequences are external to my mental life. Me moving my arm based on 
Penelope’s thought and, for example, by doing so spilling the coffee, makes me think of 
how I should act, and in that sense, Penelope’s thought affects my further cognitive life. But 
that implies an explanation of my behavior in which I have no involvement whatsoever. 
And in that sense Pitt’s proposal is subject to the very same worry he acknowledged against 
Kriegel: the extrinsic, third personal ascription does not change the intrinsic nature of the 
thought itself, even if that ascription explains my behavior in the best possible manner. And 
attributing interpretations to the states we are not directly aware of or have no immediate 
involvement in, is equally extrinsic to DUI and tracks intentionality to external factors outside 
our mental life.Simply, for a state to be conscious for me is for me to be aware of it, for a state 
to be phenomenal for me is for me to have a what-it-is-like experience of it, and for a state to 
be intentional for me is for it to represent some state of affairs for me. Penelope’s thoughts are 
none of this.
The point comes down to this. In accepting Pitt’s proposal we have a solution, but at a 
price. By accepting his solution, we give up on a clear notion of the self, which seems to be 
indispensable for phenomenal consciousness. We do accommodate unconscious states, but 
by postulating either multiplicity of the selves all of them grounds for mental states and 
exerting some influence over our behavior; or by postulating an un-unified notion of a single 
self. Either way, the reasoning requires additional premises for one to make the trade as Pitt 
proposes.
I propose to take into consideration Pitt’s proposal. I also propose that we further investigate 
un/consciousness as being an intrinsic property of mental states. However, I also propose to 
emphasize the notion of the self.
What I am interested in particular is intentionality of mental states or, more precisely, 
intentionality as a property of mental states and events that have the essential feature of 
being directed at something. What are the necessary conditions to regard a state genuinely 
intentional? Certainly, that there is an object towards which the state is directed to, seems 
to be a necessary condition. However, one can think of an object that does not correspond to 
anything in reality, hence I take object qua object of thought here simply as being identical 
with a representation, or more precisely, an object is a mental content with certain semantic 
properties, regardless of its causal history24. What the proponents of PIT propose is to stop 
the chain of attribution of intentionality in phenomenology. In that sense, only when a state 
is phenomenal it is intentional, and phenomenology provides content determinacy. What 
I am proposing is that minimal subjective experience is taken as a necessary condition nas 
well. Thus, the self seems indispensable for phenomenology, since it is quite inconceivable 
to imagine an entity experiencing without the experiential entity having that what-is-it-like of 
experience. Subjectivity is simply defined as for-me-ness25. It is not just phenomenology but 
24  I acknowledge that the question of reference and conditions of satisfaction of phenomenally intentional states is a 
serious issue. Nevertheless, I will not go into that issue at this point, since I believe I can make my claim without such 
considerations.
25  Zahavi & Kriegel (2015) have recently argued for a notion of for-me-ness that rests on conscious, 1st personal 
perspective, as a “universal feature of experience”. My proposal is somewhat different, since I do not believe for-me-






rather what-is-it-like-for-me, hence it is not just directedness, but rather directedness of the 
subject to some object x, making the what-is-it-like-for-me-ness a rather important condition for 
intentionality. In that sense, phenomenology and for-me-ness seem jointly both necessary and 
sufficient for intentionality.
It is important to note that intentionality is a property of mental states, not mental acts (Searle 
1983); this means that the subject acting on those states is not necessary for a state to be 
intentional. In the latter case we are rather talking about intention (directedness to act upon 
some underlying belief or desire). Therefore, I distinguish a wider notion of intentionality, 
which presupposes some form of agency, from a narrower notion that rests on Brentano’s 
definition of intentionality that can be best illustrated by a quotation from Brentano himself: 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages 
called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object 
(which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself… (Brentano 1973, p. 88).
As I read Brentano, intentionality is directedness towards some content in a psychological or 
mental act. Therefore, while this directedness of a subject X towards an object Y is a necessary 
condition of intentionality, this relation merely consists in the directedness to the object 
of intention in some degree, not action upon the directedness to the object of intention. 
This directedness can be of passive nature, e.g. perceptual inputs towards which we are not 
attending.
Considering that the objects of my interest are mental states, a question immediately arises: 
is there a difference between the intentionality of my occurrent mental state while tasting an 
apple and that of my Facebook status stating “The apple I am currently eating is very tasty”? 
And, if there is, what constitutes that difference?
The majority of philosophers are consistent in insisting that some difference has to be made 
between “derived” and “un-derived” forms of intentionality and “intentionality” and “as-
if intentionality”. For example, a logic proof is a formal illustration of an ordered sequence 
of statements. It represents arguments made of semantic structures, i.e. sentences, as 
mathematical objects without regard to their meanings. Those sentences are represented 
in a formal character with various symbols, e.g. P and Q. Proofs are syntactic in nature and 
involve only rules of inference between the statements. The rules of inference or behavior 
of statements in a proof is, also, represented in a formal character, e.g. we symbolize the 
conditional with →. The main point is that none of these symbols have the meaning of the 
sentence in them intrinsically26. We, as a competent category of users of those symbols, agree 
that the symbols represent what they represent. If I write P → Q, you immediately know that 
I mean “if P then Q” and if you know what P and Q stand for, you know that, e.g. if it rains, 
then the weather forecast was wrong. Some things, like logic symbols, get their meaning 
and reference from other things, i.e. us, as competent users. Since the symbols get their 
directedness towards the object of reference in a derived manner, those are cases of derived 
intentionality. On the contrary, original or underived intentional states and events get their 
meaning and reference narrowly via the mental state itself. They have the intentional content 
intrinsically.




Nevertheless, intentionality is dependent on the subject of those states, because the 
directedness of the subject towards the object of intention is a necessary condition for any 
kind of intentionality. If intentionality is defined as directedness, then it is an asymmetric 
relation. In the PIT framework, that condition comes down to some minimal kind of subjective 
experience of a mental state. Hence, my proposal, in order to preserve PIT, is to ground both 
phenomenology and intentionality in for-me-ness. Certainly, phenomenal intentionality is the 
fundamental kind of intentionality, yet there is no phenomenal experience without someone 
experiencing it. For-me-ness is a notion with its own distinctive phenomenology, but not of a 
detachable qualitative sort, i.e. it is not a quale per se27. In that sense, for-me-ness is a sui generis 
ground on which all mental life depends. The proposal is not just that the experience is in 
me as in Pitt’s thought experiment, but something more, the experience is for me. Only the 
subjective kind is the source of intentionality, as the subjective kind, on this proposed account, 
implies the necessity, of either a stronger form of experience of the object of intention 
through awareness or consciousness; or a weaker form of experience of an overall change in 
the cognitive life as giving rise to a representation through cognitive integration of the state 
in the subject’s overall mental life.
The same can be applied to unconscious states. Nevertheless, there is a substantial difference. 
One is an observer in relation to his unconscious, but one has the experience of the effect 
as giving rise to a representation in a subjective manner through a change in the subject’s 
overall cognitive life. For-me-ness is by no means a robust notion, but rather a gradient one, 
and in that sense it can be attributed to unconscious states; nevertheless it is a necessary part 
of all our phenomenal and intentional representations. If a state is conscious in itself and has 
phenomenal character in itself, then it has some minimal subjective for-me-ness as well, even 
though I do not have to be aware of it. What does this proposal come down to? What is the 
necessary condition for a state to be genuinely intentional under this thesis? Simply, that the 
state is intentional for me28,29.
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